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explores whether barrier to entry is an important factor for the cross-country differences in TFP. The 
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to entry effectively reduce entry threat, and lower entry threat leads to adoption of less productive 
technologies. The paper demonstrates that technology adopted in the economy with entry threats is at 
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presents numerical simulations that suggest entry barriers could be a quantitatively important reason for 
cross-country differences in TFP and are more harmful to productivity in the countries with monopolists 
facing inelastic demand. 
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Why does output per capita vary so much across countries? This is one of the most important
questions in economics. According to the Penn World Tables, GDP per capita in the U.S.
is more than 30 times larger than GDP per capita in the poorest ten percent of countries
in the world. A large body of research works have found that dierences in TFP is the
quantitatively most important factor for the cross-country dierences in GDP per capita.1
This raises the question of why poor countries do not use better technologies.
This paper proposes a theory of TFP dierences based on cross-country dierences in the
barriers to setting up a new business. The theory is supported by strong empirical evidence.
For example, Djankov et. al. (2002) analyze the data on the regulatory cost of setting up a
new business in 85 countries, and nd a negative correlation between GDP per capita and
the ratio of entry cost to GDP per capita. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and (2006) nd
that entry barrier is negatively related to TFP in OECD countries. Moreover, Lewis (2004)
provides industry evidence that product market regulation negatively aects productivity in
both rich and poor countries.
Motivated by these empirical works, this paper studies how entry barriers aect technol-
ogy adoption. The model developed in this paper builds on the monopolistic competition
framework with a nal good sector and many intermediate goods industries. In each in-
dustry, there is an incumbent and a potential entrant. Both of these two rms make their
technology choice based on adoption costs and compete with each other in Bertrand fashion.
This industry structure is related to Aghion et. al (2006). However, Aghion et. al (2006)
investigates how entry barriers aect the incumbent rm's technology choice in rich coun-
tries. To analyze the large dierences in TFP between rich and poor countries, this paper
deviates from Aghion et. al (2006) mainly in two ways. First, the available technology set
1See for example Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999). One
exception is Manuelli and Seshadri (2005)
1is continuous, and second, entrants do not operate at the technology frontier without cost.
As a result, the model can generate the negative relationship between entry barriers and
technology adoption, and countries with higher entry barriers are characterized by the use
of less advanced technologies and lower TFP.
Four ndings emerge from the model. The rst one is that the lack of competition leads
to adoption of less productive technologies. In particular, the paper demonstrates that the
technology adopted in the economy with entry threats is at least as good as the technology
adopted in the economy without entry threats. The second nding is that higher entry
barriers lead to adoption of less productive technologies. The third nding is that the eect
of entry barriers on technology adoption is characterized by threshold eects. In particular,
if entry barriers are below the threshold, a small reduction in entry barriers leads to adoption
of more productive technologies. However, if entry barriers are above the threshold, a small
reduction in entry barriers has no eect on technology adoption. The fourth nding is that
entry barriers could be an quantitatively important reason for the cross-country dierences
in TFP and the size of the quantitative eects depends on the demand elasticity. Moreover,
the quantitative eects are bigger when the demand is price inelastic.2
The key economic mechanism underlying these results is that higher entry barriers eec-
tively reduce entry threats and lower entry threats lead to adoption of less productive tech-
nologies. To understand this, it is useful to rst consider an economy without the potential
entrants. In this simpler economy, the incumbent's incentive of adopting better technologies
is to reduce production costs. In the economy with potential entrants, the incumbent has
more incentive to adopt better technologies, since if it adopts a low technology, the potential
entrant will come in and steal the market. The lower the entry barriers are, the better the
technology the incumbent has to adopt in order to prevent entry. However, when the entry
2Although these results are derived from the static model presented in this paper, I have shown in another
paper that all of them still hold in a dynamic version of the model.
2barriers are suciently large, the incumbent knows for sure that the potential entrant will
not enter, and therefore adopts the same technology as that in the economy without po-
tential entrants. It follows that entry barriers have no eects on technology adoption when
they are suciently large, and have negative eects on technology adoption otherwise. The
idea of entry deterrence in this paper relates to the industrial organization literature that
investigates rm's strategic behavior. Examples include Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and
Bulow et. al (1995). However, a major focus of these papers has been on the industry level
instead of the aggregate level.
This paper is related to the literature which examines rms' incentive of adopting new
technologies.3 It also relates to the literature which oers theory for the cross-country
dierences in TFP.4 Among those, the most related ones are Parente and Prescott (1999)
and Herrendorf and Teixeira (2007). These two papers also examine the eects of barriers
to entry on TFP, but they study the entry barriers in the labor market and unions act as
the barrier to the adoption of new technologies. In contrast, this paper studies the entry
barriers in the product market and the regulatory costs of setting up a new business act as
the barrier to the adoption of better technologies. The paper shows that entry barriers in the
product market can also have negative consequences for technology adoption. In addition,
because the entry barrier is modeled as a xed entry cost to the product market, the model
developed in this paper has the potential to be connected with the data on the entry cost
constructed by Djankov et. al. (2002). Moreover, this paper has implication about the
importance of demand elasticity on the quantitative eect of entry barriers on technology
adoption. In particular, the paper shows that entry barriers are more harmful in countries
with monopolist facing inelastic demand.
3Examples include Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005), Bridgman et. al (2007),
Acemoglu (2007), Holmes et. al (2008), and Desmet and Parente (2008).
4Examples include Amaral and Quintin (2007), Erosa and Hidalgo (2008), Buera et. al (2008), Guner et
al. (2006), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2002), Holmes and Schmitz (1995), Herrendorf
and Teixeira (2005), and Easterly and Levine (2003).
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the economic environ-
ment. Section 3 denes the symmetric equilibrium. Section 4 denes the limited competition
economy and characterizes the symmetric equilibrium in this economy. Section 5 character-
izes the symmetric equilibrium dened in section 3. Section 6 assesses the quantitative eects
of entry barriers on technology adoption. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
The model can be best described as a standard monopolistic competition model with tech-
nology adoption choice. As the standard model, there is a representative household, and
two production sectors: a nal good sector and an intermediate goods sector. The inter-
mediate goods sector consists of a continuum of measure 1 of industries and each industry
produces a distinct intermediate good. The new ingredient is that in each industry, there is
an incumbent and a potential entrant and both of them can adopt new technologies from a
continuous set of available technologies.
2.1 Household
There is a representative household with preferences dened over consumption of a single




The parameter  satises   0. There is no labor-leisure choice. The representative
household has a time endowment of one. The household owns all rms and hence will
receive all prots.
42.2 Production
2.2.1 Final Good Production
There are two production sectors: an intermediate goods sector and a nal good sector. The
intermediate goods sector consists of a continuum of mass one of industries, each of which
produces a distinct intermediate good. The nal good is produced by a representative rm











For now, I assume that the demand for the intermediates is price inelastic, that is 0 <  < 1.
The case with  > 1 will be discussed later.5
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Production
There is a continuum of measure one of industries, each of which produces a distinct in-
termediate x. For reasons of tractability, the environment is symmetric with respect to
intermediates. Hence, I will not specify the industry index unless it is necessary.
In each industry, there is a continuum of technologies available, indexed by their labor
productivity. In particular, each technology is of the form x = Ah, where h is the labor
input, and A 2 [0;Af]. Af is the technology frontier. In what follows, I will identify a
technology by its value of A.
Each industry consists of one incumbent, one informal incumbent and one potential
entrant. Each incumbent is endowed with an initial technology A0 where A0 < Af. At
the beginning of the period, the incumbent makes a choice about updating its technology.
The cost of updating from A to A0 is given by id(A;A0), and is measured in units of the
5Although the qualitative implications are not dependent on whether  is less than one or greater than one,
the details of the arguments are dierent in the two cases, and therefore, they must be handled separately.
5nal good. The updating cost could dier across countries, and the dierences are captured
by the dierences in the shift parameter i. The function d is strictly decreasing in its
rst argument, strictly increasing and strictly convex in its second argument, and satises
d(A;A) = 0 for all A.
Each informal incumbent can only operate with its endowed technology A, where A < A0.
The informal incumbent can be thought of as street vendors, which operate with very low
technologies.
The potential entrant has to pay a cost  to enter, where  is the parameter that indexes
the size of the barriers to entry in dierent countries, and is also measured in units of
the nal good. I assume that   0. This implies that subsidies on entry are excluded.
Conditional on paying , the potential entrant then chooses a technology A 2 [A;Af] and
incurs a cost of ed(A;A), where d is the same function introduced earlier.6 This implies
that d(A;A) = 0. Comparing with the informal incumbent, the potential entrant can also
use A for free, but paying  gives the potential entrant a right to adopt a technology better
than A.7 i and e could be dierent and the dierence re
ects the dierence in the adoption
cost of the incumbent and the potential entrant. For example, if the new technology needs
a lot of reorganization, the potential entrant will have a lower adoption cost and e < i.
But if experience is crucial in adopting the new technology, the incumbent will have a lower
adoption cost and i < e.
2.3 Timing
In a given industry, the players are the incumbent, the informal incumbent and the potential
entrant. They play a four-stage game. In the rst stage, the incumbent chooses which
6The parameter e is again a shift parameter that could vary across countries.
7The rst argument in the adoption cost function for the potential entrant represents an obsolete technol-
ogy that has a zero adoption cost. All the results in this paper will not change if this technology is dierent
from A.
6technology to upgrade to. In the second stage, the potential entrant decides whether to
enter, and if so, its level of technology. If the potential entrant does not enter, then in
the third stage, the incumbent and the informal incumbent play a Bertrand game. If the
potential entrant does enter, then, the potential entrant, the informal incumbent and the
incumbent play a Bertrand game in the third stage. In the fourth stage, production and
consumption take place and the game ends.
3 Equilibrium
This section denes the decentralized equilibrium for the economy just described. The
equilibrium concept is symmetric sub-game perfect where all incumbents behave identically,
all informal incumbent behave identically and all potential entrants behave identically. This
equilibrium has the following features. The consumer behaves competitively in both the nal
output and the labor market, and the nal good producer behaves competitively in both the
nal good market and the intermediate goods market. Intermediate goods producers behave
competitively in the labor market and play the four-stage game described earlier in the
intermediate goods market. Since each industry is small, players in each industry play the
four-stage game taking as given the demand for the output of their industry, the wage in the
competitive labor market and the price of the nal good.
In what follows, I denote the wage rate by w and the price of intermediate goods by p.
The price of the nal good is normalized to 1. Since the equilibrium is sub-game perfect, it
is solved by backward induction.
73.1 Household Sector
The household sector is standard. Taking prices and prots as given, the household maxi-





s:t: c = w + ;
where  is the total prots.
3.2 Final Good Sector
The nal good producer maximizes prot taking as given the prices of inputs (pj)1
j=0 and





























3.2.1 Intermediate Goods Sector
In each industry, the incumbent, the informal incumbent and the potential entrant play the
game described earlier, taking as given the demand for their product, the wage w and the
price of the nal good.
Stage 3: In stage 3, the incumbent's technology Ai, and the potential entrant's entry
8decision and technology Ae have all been determined. If there is no entry in stage 2, the
incumbent and the informal incumbent play a two rm Bertrand game. In a two rm
Bertrand game, the rm with lower marginal cost will capture the entire market and charge
a price which is no greater than the higher marginal cost. Since A0 > A, the incumbent
necessarily has a better technology than the informal incumbent, and therefore charges a
price no greater than the informal incumbent's marginal cost w










The fact that the demand is inelastic implies that the incumbent wants to charge a price as





If, instead, the potential entrant has entered, the incumbent, the informal incumbent and
the potential entrant play a three rm Bertrand Game.8 Similar to the two rm Bertrand
game, in a three rm Bertrand game, the rm with the lowest marginal cost will capture the
entire market and charge a price which is no greater than the second lowest marginal cost.
If the potential entrant does enter, it must have a better technology than the incumbent
and the informal incumbent, since otherwise, the potential entrant cannot make any prot
in stage 3 to cover the entry cost in stage 2, and therefore, would never have entered. Since
the incumbent has a better technology than the informal incumbent, conditional upon entry,
the potential entrant charges a price no greater than the incumbent's marginal cost w
Ai and
8If the incumbent and the potential entrant have the same technology, I assume that the incumbent will
capture all the market demand.













Stage 2: In the second stage, the potential entrant makes its entry decision. If the prot the
potential entrant can make after entry is higher than the entry cost, the potential entrant will
enter, otherwise, it will not enter. Conditional upon entry, the potential entrant maximizes
prot taking as given the demand function, the wage w, the price of the nal good and the















It is easy to show that this maximization problem is strictly concave, and therefore has a
unique solution. Let e(Ai;B;w) be the value of this maximization problem. The potential
entrant makes the entry decision by comparing e(Ai;B;w) and . If e(Ai;B;w)  , the
potential entrant will not enter, and if e(Ai;B;w) > , the potential entrant will enter. For
future reference, it is easy to show that e is decreasing in Ai. To see this, note that the
price p the potential entrant charges is w
Ai and inelastic demand implies that e(Ai;B;w) is
increasing p, hence decreasing in Ai.
Stage 1 : Because e(Ai;B;w) is decreasing in Ai, the incumbent can alter its choice
10of Ai to in
uence the potential entrant's entry decision. In particular, in order to end up
with positive prot, the incumbent must choose Ai, s.t e(Ai;B;w)     0. Otherwise
the potential entrant will enter and the incumbent will have zero sales. Let B be the




















If B  0, then it is optimal for the incumbent to update its technology, in which case, the
potential entrant does not enter, and I will say entry is \blocked".9 Otherwise, it is not
protable for the incumbent to update its technology, in which case, the incumbent have
zero sales and the potential entrant enters, and I will say entry is not \blocked".
Denition 1: (Symmetric Equilibrium) A symmetric, sub-game perfect equilibrium is a
set of prices (w;p;pe;pi), allocations (c;x), technologies (Ai;Ae) and entry decision E such
that:
(i) E solves the representative entrant's entry problem. In particular, E = 1 re
ects entry
and E = 0 re
ects no entry;
(ii) When E = 0, (Ai;pi) solves the incumbent's problem, and p = pi;
(iii) When E = 1, (Ae;pe) solves the entrant's problem, and p = pe.
(iv) c solves the representative consumer's problem;
(v) x solves the nal good producer's problem;
(vi) Markets clear.
9It could also be the case that entry is blocked even if the incumbent does not update its technology.
11There are two types of symmetric equilibria: equilibrium with entry and equilibrium
without entry. From now on, I refer to them as the symmetric equilibrium without entry,
and the symmetric equilibrium with entry.
4 The Limited Competition Economy
To understand the results that follow it is useful to rst consider a simpler economy which
is the economy just described except without potential entrants. This economy will serve
as a useful benchmark. In this economy, the incumbent only faces competition in their own
market from the informal incumbent. Moreover, because the informal incumbent can only
use an inferior technology, this competition is rather limited. For this reason, I will refer to
this as the limited competition economy.












A0  A  A
f
As noted earlier, the incumbent will necessarily set p = w
A. It is easy to show that the
incumbent's objective function is strictly concave in A for given values of B and w, hence,
if the solution is interior, it is unique and determined by the rst order condition.
Substituting p = w







In a symmetric equilibrium, xj = A for all j. This implies that B = A. Substituting xj = A
for all j, B = A and p = w
A into the nal good producer's rst order condition gives w = A.








Let ALC be the incumbent's technology in the symmetric equilibrium of the limited
competition economy. Since d is strictly convex in A, the left of (4.2) is strictly decreasing
in A, and crosses zero at most once. It follows that if ALC is interior, it is unique and
determined by (4.2), otherwise, it is either A0 or Af. The incumbent's prot can then by
derived, which is ALC  A id(A0;ALC). For the existence of the symmetric equilibrium in
the limited competition economy, this prot must be nonnegative. In what follows, I assume
that this is always true.
If ALC = Af, then, the economy with limited competition will adopt the frontier tech-
nology. Since my focus is on how the lack of competition can retard technology adoption,
this case is of limited interest, and in what follows, I will assume that ALC < Af.
For future reference, note that when the entry cost is innite in the economy with po-
tential entrants, the incumbent knows for sure that the potential entrant will not enter, and
can behave as if there are no potential entrants, hence the economy with innite entry cost
has the same equilibrium as the limited competition economy.
5 Symmetric Equilibrium
This section analyze the symmetric equilibrium dened earlier. The rst part of this section
focuses on the symmetric equilibrium without entry, and the second part focuses on the
symmetric equilibrium with entry.
135.1 Symmetric Equilibrium Without Entry
5.1.1 Existence and Uniqueness
This section establishes the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium without
entry as a function of the parameters i, e and . In general, one would not expect such
an equilibrium to exist for all combinations of these three parameters. For example, if i is
innity, and e and  are both 0, the potential entrants will enter for sure and a symmetric
equilibrium without entry cannot exist. However it is easy to show that such an equilibrium
does exist for a large set of i, e and . In particular, it is intuitive that such an equilibrium
will exist for a given i if e and  are suciently large. To see this, note that given i and
, if e is suciently large, the potential entrant needs to pay a higher cost to adopt any
technology, making it easier for the incumbent to block entry. Similarly, given i and e, if
 is suciently big, the potential entrant needs to pay a higher cost to overcome entry, also
making it easier for the incumbent to block entry. This analysis is formalized in Proposition
1.
Proposition 1: Holding i constant, if e and  are suciently large,10 the symmetric
equilibrium without entry exists and is unique.
Proof: See Appendix.
To guarantee existence, it is not necessary to have both  and e to be large. In fact,
as long as one of them is large enough, the symmetric equilibrium without entry exists. For
example, for a given i and e = 1, the symmetric equilibrium without entry exists even
when  = 0. Similarly, for a given i and  = 1, the symmetric equilibrium without entry
exists even when e = 0. This implies that the set of  that guarantees existence depends on
the value of i and e, and the set of e that guarantees existence depends on the value of
i and . In particular, the proof of Proposition 1 shows that for a given pair of i and e,
10Please see the cuto value of e and  in the proof of Proposition 1.
14there exists a C such that when  is greater than C
11, the symmetric equilibrium without
entry exists.
Although it is easy to establish existence, it takes some work to establish uniqueness.
The issue comes from the strategic complementarity between the technology choices of the
incumbents. To see it, note that the potential entrant j0s prot e
j(Ai
j;B;w) is decreasing
in the incumbent j0s technology Ai









constant in the demand function. Let Ai
 j be the technology adopted by the incumbents in
all of the other industries. It follows that e
j(Ai
j;B;w) is also increasing in Ai
 j, since the
incumbent j0s demand Bp
 
j is increasing in Ai
 j. More importantly, holding Ai
 j constant, in
an symmetric equilibrium without entry, the incumbent j will upgrade to a technology which
equalizes the potential entrant j0s prot and the entry cost. Hence as Ai
 j increases, it takes
a higher A for the incumbent j to block entry. In other words, if everyone else has adopted
a higher A then it is also necessary for the incumbent j to adopt a higher A. This implies
that the technology adoption choices among incumbents are strategic complements. Cooper
and John (1998) then suggests the possibility of multiple symmetric equilibria without entry.
However, if Ai
j is not very responsive to the change in Ai
 j, the strategic eects will not be
suciently strong to produce multiple equilibria. This is guaranteed by large enough e.12
The idea behind this is intuitive. Increases in e make it more costly for the potential entrant
to adopt a better technology. This retards the response of the potential entrant j0s choice of
technology to the changes in Ai
 j, and therefore, retards the response of the incumbent j0s
choice of technology to the changes in Ai
 j. Hence, if e is suciently large, Ai
j is not very
responsive to the change in Ai
 j, and the symmetric equilibrium without entry is unique. In
what follows, I will assume that existence and uniqueness hold.
Corollary 1: If e  i, there exists a symmetric equilibrium without entry for any
11Please refer to the proof of Proposition 1 for the expression of C.
12it is not necessary to have e > i to guarantee the uniqueness. In fact, even when i = e, the
symmetric equilibrium without entry is unique in all the examples provided in section 6.
15  0, and there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with entry for any   0.
Proof: See Appendix.
To understand Corollary 1, note that when e  i, the incumbent can always make
greater prot than the potential entrant. Because the potential entrant faces a higher adop-
tion cost for any technology and also needs to pay the entry cost, Hence, a symmetric
equilibrium with entry cannot exist, and in contrast, a symmetric equilibrium without entry
exists.
5.1.2 Characterizing the Symmetric Equilibrium Without Entry
This subsection analyzes some properties of the symmetric equilibrium without entry. Let
ANE be the technology adopted by the incumbent in the symmetric equilibrium without
entry. The following proposition summarizes several properties of ANE holding i and e
constant.
Proposition 2: There exists LC
13, s.t if   LC, ANE = ALC, and if C   < LC,
ANE > ALC.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 describes the eects of entry barriers on the technology adopted in the
symmetric equilibrium without entry. LC in this Proposition is the level of entry barriers
such that when the incumbent adopts ALC, the potential entrant is indierent between to
enter and not to enter. As noted in section 4, if the entry cost is innite, the incumbent does
not need to worry about the existence of the potential entrant, and therefore will upgrade to
ALC. By continuity, this is true for suciently large entry costs, and LC is the cuto value.
However, if the entry cost is suciently low, the incumbent has to upgrade to a technology
better than ALC in order to block entry, since otherwise, the potential entrant will enter and
steal the market. This implies that even if there is no entry, the entry threat can still lead
13Please refer to the proof Lemma 1 in the appendix for the expression of LC.
16to a better technology in the economy,
In the limited competition economy, the incumbent experiences relatively little competi-
tion since the informal incumbent's technology is low and xed. But, when there are potential
entrants, competition becomes intense. Proposition 2 has proved that the technology in the
economy with potential entrants is at least as good as that in the economy without potential
entrants. This re
ects one of the key features of the model: the lack of competition leads to
adoption of less productive technologies.
The next proposition summarizes the comparative statics of the parameters i, e and 
on technology adopted in the symmetric equilibrium without entry.
Proposition 3: (Comparative Statics) If   LC, ANE is decreasing in i, and does
not depend on  and e. If C   < LC, ANE is decreasing in e and , and does not
depend on i.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind proposition 3 is straightforward. To begin with, note that when
  LC, ANE = ALC, in which case  and e are irrelevant for the choice of technology.
However, larger i does decrease ANE, since larger e implies higher adoption costs. When
C   < LC, as e increases, the potential entrant's prot decreases, hence, the incumbent
can block entry by upgrading to a less productive technology. Similarly, as  increases, the
potential entrant's net prot of entry decreases, hence the incumbent can also block entry
by upgrading to a less productive technology.
It may seem puzzling that i has such dierent eects on the technology adopted when
 is in dierent ranges. However, the intuition behind this result is simple. To see it, note
that when making the choice of technology, the incumbent considers both the size of the
adoption cost and the threat of entry. When   LC, the incumbent does not need to
worry about the entry threat, hence it chooses the technology solely depending upon the
size of the adoption cost. But when 0   < LC, the incumbent must take into account
17the fact that the potential entrant may enter, and hence, upgrades to a larger A, thereby
incurring a higher cost. In particular, to maximize prot, the incumbent upgrades to the
lowest possible technology to block entry, which is the technology that gives the potential
entrant zero value of entry. This technology is solely determined by the potential entrant's
maximization problem, and therefore does not depend on i.
Proposition 3 implies that the relation between entry barriers and technology adoption is
characterized by threshold eects. This follows from the fact that ANE does not depend on 
when   LC and is decreasing in  when C    LC. This nding has implications for
empirical studies, since they often impose a linear relationship. This nding also has policy
implications. In countries with entry barriers below the threshold LC, a small reduction
in entry barriers leads to adoption of more productive technologies. But in countries with
entry barriers above the threshold, a small reduction in the entry barriers has no eect on
technology adoption. Observing such an outcome, one might be tempted to conclude that
reducing barriers is not benecial for technology adoption. But in fact, the correct conclusion
may simply be that entry barriers have not been reduced enough.
5.1.3 Welfare in the Symmetric Equilibrium without Entry
It is also of interest to examine the eects of the entry cost  on welfare. In this static
economy, consumption is one appropriate measure of welfare. When   LC, consumption
equals ALC  id(A0;ALC) in the symmetric equilibrium without entry, and does not change
with the entry cost.
When C   < LC, consumption c equals ANE   id(A0;ANE). From Proposition 3,
ANE is decreasing in . It follows that consumption is decreasing in  if c is increasing in
ANE, and is increasing in  if c is decreasing in ANE. The derivative of c with respect to
ANE is:
@c
@ANE = 1   
i@d(A0;ANE)
@ANE (5.1)
18Since d is strictly convex in ANE, @c
@ANE is strictly decreasing in ANE. Let W be the value
of  which induces the ANE such that @c
@ANE = 0. @ANE
@ < 0 and @2c
@(ANE)2 < 0 then imply
@c
@ANE > 0 if  > W, and @c
@ANE < 0 if  < W. Comparing (4.2) and (5.1), it is easy
to see that @c
@ANEjANE=ALC > 0, hence, W is smaller than LC. If W is also smaller than
C, consumption is always increasing in ANE, and therefore is always decreasing in  in
the symmetric equilibrium without entry. In this case, reducing barriers to entry increases
welfare, since more productive technologies are used.
However, if W > C, consumption is increasing in ANE when  2 [W;LC], and
is decreasing in ANE when  2 [C;W). Hence, consumption is decreasing in  when
 2 [W;LC], and is increasing in  when  2 [C;W). The intuition behind this is simple.
When  2 [W;LC], as  decreases, the incumbent adopts a better technology, hence output
increases and consumption increases. But, when  2 [C;W), the entry cost is so low that
as  decreases, to block entry, the incumbent has to adopt a technology so costly that the
increase in output by using this technology is smaller than the increase in the cost of adopting
this technology, hence consumption decreases. Note that cost to technology adoption can be
viewed as investment in the current model, and therefore this result can also be interpreted
as when  2 [C;W), to compete with its rival, the incumbent has to overinvest.
In the context of this model, taking all costs as given, social planner will always choose
a technology to maximize consumption. The above results then imply that the equilibrium
technology could be either less than the socially optimal level, or greater than or equal to
the socially optimal level.14 This happens because the incumbent's objective, blocking entry
so as to maximize prot, is dierent from the social planner. In particular, when the entry
cost is small enough, the incumbent even over upgrades to block entry.
14This has the same spirit as Mankiw and Whinston (1986), which demonstrates that when there are
xed set-up costs upon entry, imperfect competition and business-stealing eect, the number of rms in a
free-entry equilibrium could be greater than, less than or equal to the socially optimal level.
195.2 Symmetric Equilibrium With Entry
The symmetric equilibrium without entry exists if e and  are suciently large. In contrast,
a symmetric equilibrium with entry exists if e and  are small. For example, if e and 
are both 0, the potential entrant will enter and a symmetric equilibrium with entry does
exist. In fact, Proposition 4 proves that when e and  are suciently small, the symmetric
equilibrium with entry exists and is unique. Because as e or  becomes smaller, it is more
protable for the potential entrant to enter, or equivalently, less protable for the incumbent
to block entry. The uniqueness of this equilibrium is guaranteed by the convexity of the cost
functions.
Proposition 4: Holding i constant, If e and  are suciently small, the symmetric
equilibrium with entry exists and is unique.
Proof: See appendix.
In the symmetric equilibrium with entry, it is not protable for the incumbent to block
entry, and therefore, the incumbent does not update its technology and does not produce.
Let AE be the technology adopted by the potential entrants in the symmetric equilibrium
with entry. Proposition 5 summarizes the comparative static in this equilibrium.
Proposition 5: AE is decreasing in e, and does not depend on  and i.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is simple. Bigger e increases the potential entrant's
adoption cost, hence leads to adoption of less productive technology. Conditional on entry,
the entry cost is treated as sunk cost by the potential entrant, this is why it has no eect
on the potential entrant's choice of technology. Once the incumbent's monopoly power is
broken, i is irrelevant, hence it does not aect AE. In the symmetric equilibrium with entry,
consumption equals AE  ed(A;AE) . Since AE does not depend on , it is obvious that
welfare is decreasing in . This is because more resources are used to overcome the barriers
to entry.
20Since the existence of the symmetric equilibria depends on the size of the entry barriers,
a natural question to ask is whether the type of equilibrium switches when the entry cost
changes while all the other parameters are constant. It turns out that by choosing dierent
pair of i and e, varying  can produce three cases. In the rst case, only the symmetric
equilibrium without entry exists. This happens when e is large enough relative to i. In
particular, Corollary 1 proves that as long as e  i, the symmetric equilibrium with entry
does not exist and the symmetric equilibrium without entry exists for any .
In the second case, the symmetric equilibrium switches from one to another while 
varies, but there is a range of  in which no symmetric equilibrium exists. In the third
case, not only the symmetric equilibrium switches, but also they can exist at the same time
in some range of . This happens because of the general equilibrium eects in the model.
To see it, recall that the price the potential entrant charges is the ratio between the wage
rate and the incumbent's technology, and it is easy to derive that the wage rate is A in the
symmetric equilibrium without entry and is A0 in the symmetric equilibrium with entry. It







j, and if entry can be blocked in all the other industries, the potential






j. Hence, for any Ai
j, the potential entrant j
can charge a higher price if there is entry in all the other industries, and therefore makes
higher prots in this case. This implies that when there is entry in all the other industries,
it is more protable for the potential entrant j to enter as well. Similarly, when entry can
be blocked in all the other industries, it is also more protable for the incumbent j to block
entry. This complementarity between the potential entrants as well as the complementarity
between the incumbents may produces the coexistence of the symmetric equilibrium with
entry and the symmetric equilibrium without entry for some combinations of i and e.
216 Numerical Examples
Two natural questions emerge from the analysis in section 5. One is how large is the quanti-
tative eects of entry barriers on technology adoption, and the other one is how the primitives
in the model aect the quantitative eects. To explore those two questions, I perform several
numerical experiments in this section.
6.1 Quantitative Eects of Entry Barriers on Technology Adop-
tion
To do the experiments, functional forms and parameter values need to be specied. I nor-












implies that it takes few resources to update from A to A0 as the technology frontier in-
creases. As a benchmark, I set 
 = 2, A0 = 20%Af, and A = 10%A0. Following Parente and
Prescott (1999),  is set to be 0.9. The sensitivity test on these parameters are performed
later. I set i = e and then calibrate this value so that when the entry cost  is 0, the
technology adopted is 90% of the frontier technology. Note that from Corollary 1, when
i = e, the symmetric equilibrium with entry does not exist and the symmetric equilibrium
without entry exists for all   0. Hence, C is equal to 0 in all the experiments performed
in this section.15
Figure 1 illustrates how the technology adopted changes with the entry cost to GDP
ratio in the benchmark experiment. Based on gure 1, the relationship of entry cost and
technology adopted described in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 also holds when replacing
the entry cost by entry cost to GDP ratio. In particular, when the entry cost to GDP ratio is
bigger than 0.29, the technology adopted by the incumbent does not change with entry cost,
15The symmetric equilibrium without entry is unique for all the experiments performed in this section.
22Figure 1: Benchmark Experiment
and when the entry cost to GDP ratio is smaller than 0.29, the technology adopted by the
incumbent is decreasing in the entry cost. In this example, W = 0, implying that welfare
is always decreasing in the entry cost. Figure 1 also illustrates the size of the quantitative
eects of entry barriers on TFP. Based on the gure, if the relative entry cost is reduced by
6 times from the threshold, TFP will increase by 2 times. Panel A of table III in Djankov
et. al (2002) shows that the entry cost varies from 1.7% of GDP per capita in the U.S to 5
times of GDP per capita in Dominican Republic, and 6 times of dierence in the entry cost
to GDP ratio is not large at all. For example, the entry cost to GDP ratio is about 15 times
larger in Argentina and is about 50 times larger in India than that in the U.S.
6.2 The Eects of the Primitives
This section explores how the primitives in the model aect the size of the quantitative
eects of entry barriers on the technology adopted. To begin with, A0 has little impact on
23the quantitative eects. To see this, note that when C   < LC, A0 does not aect the
equilibrium technology ANE, since A0 only aects the incumbent's adoption cost, and ANE
does not depend on the incumbent's adoption cost.16 When   LC, A0 may aect ANE,
which equals ALC in this case. However, the function d used in this section implies that the
marginal cost of upgrading does not depend on A0, hence A0 does not aect ALC as long as
ALC is interior, which is true for all the examples in this section.
I now turn to analyze how the demand elasticity  aects the quantitative eects of entry
barriers on technology adoption. Thus far the analysis has assumed that 0 <  < 1, i.e.,
the demand for intermediates is price inelastic. In fact, under some reasonable conditions,
the theoretical ndings in section 5 also hold when the demand is price elastic. Hence,
the numerical experiments here will cover both the elastic case and the inelastic case. In
particular, I perform the following experiments. I set values for A0, A and 
 to be the same
values as those in the benchmark experiment. I then choose dierent values for , and for
each , I set i = e and recalibrate them so that when  = 0, the technology adopted is
90% of the frontier technology.
Figure 2 illustrates the results from the experiments on . Panel (a) shows the cases
when 0 <  < 1, while panel (b) shows the cases when  > 1. Three patterns emerge from
gure 2. First, the size of the quantitative eects is smaller when the demand is price elastic.
The intuition behind this is simple. The incumbent faces two types of competition. One is
from the potential entrant in the same industry and the other is from the producers in other
industries. If the intermediates are good substitutes, the incumbent faces intense competition
from the producers in other industries, and therefore will adopt a better technology even
when the entry barriers are high. As a result, the eects of entry barriers on technology
adoption is much smaller when the demand is price elastic. This implies that entry barriers
are more harmful in countries with monopolists facing inelastic demand.
16This is similar to the argument that i does not aect ANE when C   < LC.
24From panel (b) of gure 2, when the demand is price elastic, an increase in  leads to an
increase in ALC and a decrease in LC. Although only two curves are shown in gure 2(b), it
turns out that when  is greater than 1.5, LC = 0 and ALC = 0:9. The intuition behind this
pattern is similar to the intuition behind the rst pattern. As  increases, competition among
incumbents becomes more intense, hence, ALC increases. The increase in ALC then leads to
the decrease in LC, since as ALC increases, the incumbent can block entry by adopting ALC
even if entry barrier is slightly lower. To see this, recall that LC is the level of entry barriers
such that when the incumbent adopts ALC, the potential entrant is indierent between to
enter and not to enter.
The third pattern is that when the demand is inelastic, as  increases, ALC decreases,
LC increases, and ANE increases for any given entry cost when 0   < LC. The intuition
behind this is provided as follows. To begin with, when  increases, i increases, and therefore
ALC decreases. Although the decrease in ALC is one reason for the increase in LC, it is
not the main reason. In fact, the main reason is that increases in  lead to increases in
the potential entrant's prot after entry. To see this, recall that the potential entrant must
charge a price less than what the incumbent charges if it were to enter. As  increases, the
demand becomes more elastic, which implies that when the potential entrant undercut the
incumbent's price, the demand responds more to this reduction in price, and therefore the
potential entrant's revenue increases, or equivalently, the potential entrant's prot increases.
It follows that LC needs to be larger so that when   LC, the incumbent can block entry
by adopting ALC. Moreover, when 0   < LC, as  increases, the incumbent has to adopt
a higher A to block entry at any , since the potential entrant's prot is increasing in  and
decreasing in the incumbent's technology.
Figure 3 illustrates how A aects the quantitative eects of entry barriers on technology
adoption. Similar to the experiments on , as A changes, I recalibrate i and e so that
when  = 0, the technology adopted is 90% of the frontier technology.
25Figure 2: Eects of 
(a) Inelastic
(b) Elastic
26Figure 3: Eects of A
Figure 3 shows that when A increases, ANE increases for any given entry cost, and LC
decreases. This pattern is caused by the general equilibrium eects. Recall that in the
symmetric equilibrium without entry, the wage rate equals A. Hence, as A increases, it is
more costly to hire labor. It follows that when   LC, the incumbent substitutes labor
with a better technology, and therefore ALC increases. Moreover, when 0   < LC,
the potential entrant substitutes labor with a better technology, and therefore forces the
incumbent to adopt a better technology to block entry. The decrease in LC is again caused
the increase in ALC.
The sensitivity test for 
 is illustrated in gure 4. Similar to the earlier experiments,
as 
 changes, I recalibrate i and e. Figure 4 shows that 
 has no eects on ANE when
0   < LC. This happens because 
 aects the incumbents' and the potential entrants'
adoption costs in the same way. However, an increase in 
 does lead to an increase in ALC
and a decrease in LC. To understand this, note that as 
 increases, function d becomes less
27Figure 4: Eects of 

convex, and therefore at the margin, it is less costly for the incumbent to adopt a better
technology in the limited competition economy, As noted before, the decrease in LC is due
to the increase in ALC.
To summarize, the numerical examples show that the quantitative eects of entry barriers
on technology adoption could be large, and the demand elasticity of the intermediates is the
key parameter for the size of this quantitative eects. In particular, the quantitative eects
are large when the demand is inelastic and are small when the demand is elastic.
7 Conclusion
This paper has developed a new model to link barriers to entry and technology adoption.
In the model, if entry barriers are innitely large, a small reduction in the barrier will not
change the rm's incentive for technology adoption. However, if the entry barriers are below
the threshold, a small reduction in the barrier will force the incumbent to adopt a better
28technology, because the incumbent fears of being replaced by a new rm and losing its
monopoly power. Simple calculations based on the model suggests that entry barriers could
be a quantitatively important reason for the cross-country dierences in TFP and the size
of the quantitative eect depends on the demand elasticity. Moreover, the calculations have
shown that entry barriers are more harmful in the economy with monopolists facing inelastic
demand.
This paper has clearly presented the mechanism through which barriers to entry reduce
the technology adopted. But, more serious works are needed to evaluate the quantitative
eect of these barriers on productivity. Except the demand elasticity, the quantitative eects
of entry barriers on technology adoption may also depend on the development of nancial
market. In particular, the quantitative eect could be manifested by the nancial market
imperfection, since it is hard to nance the large entry cost in the economy with less developed
nancial market.17 Moreover, since dierent industries face dierent size of set-up cost, one
can imagine that barriers to entry may have uneven eects on dierent industries. These
subjects are left for future research.
17This is related to Erosa and Hidalgo (2008), which nd that there are large cross-industry productivity
dierentials in poor countries and the share of employment in the sectors that need more external nancing
is positively correlated with the nancial market development.
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32A Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1: For any i and e, conditional upon the existence of the symmetric equilibrium
without entry, there exists LC, s.t if   LC, ANE = ALC, and if  < LC, ANE > ALC.18
Proof: ANE in Lemma 1 describes the technology adopted by the incumbent in the














This lemma can be proved as follows. Step 1 proves that when   LC, the symmetric
equilibrium without entry exists and is unique. Moreover, the incumbent adopts ALC in
the this equilibrium. Step 2 shows that when  < LC, the incumbent adopts a technology
better than ALC in the symmetric equilibrium without entry conditional upon existence.
Step 1: As noted in section 4, when the entry cost is innity, the incumbent adopts the
same technology in the symmetric equilibrium without entry as in the symmetric equilibrium
of the limited competition economy. By continuity, this is true as long as  is large enough so
that entry can be blocked when the incumbent upgrade to ALC. In particular, what follows
shows that this is true as long as   LC.
Suppose all incumbents upgrade to ALC in the symmetric equilibrium without entry. It






























The rst order condition for Ae











Inelastic demand implies that the price constraint binds. Substituting pe
j = w
ALC, B = ALC
18When i is suciently small or e is suciently large, LC may be zero. In this case, ANE is always
equal to ALC.










The potential entrant's net prot is then given by

e










j)    (A.3)
where Ae
j is determined by the above rst order condition. When   LC, it is easy to
derive e
j     e
j   LC  0.
This proves that when   LC, the incumbent can block entry when upgrading to ALC,
and therefore adopts ALC in the symmetric equilibrium without entry. The uniqueness of
this equilibrium is guaranteed by the uniqueness of ALC.
Step 2: This part shows that when  < LC, the incumbent chooses a technology better
than ALC in the symmetric equilibrium without entry. This is proved by contradiction.
When  < LC, it is easy to show e
j    > e
j   LC = 0. Hence, entry can not be
blocked when the incumbent upgrades to ALC. Suppose the symmetric equilibrium without
entry exists when  < LC and the incumbent adopts Ai < ALC in such an equilibrium. It
follows that B = Ai, w = A and e
j(Ai;Ai;w)  .











































Substituting B = Ai, w = A and pi
j = w
A into the above expression and evaluating it at
34Ai








@Aij(Ai=ALC) = 0 (A.5)
The inequality is derived because Ai < ALC and
A
Ai   i @d
@Ai is a decreasing function of Ai.







j < 0. Hence e
j(Ai
j;Ai;w) <  for any Ai
j > Ai. Let  be a
small number. It follows that e
j(Ai+;Ai;w)  < 0, i.e., the no entry constraint is satised
when Ai
j = Ai + . From (A.5), B
j is decreasing around Ai, hence the incumbent can make
more prot by adopting Ai+ instead of adopting Ai. This contradicts with the assumption
that Ai is the technology adopted by the incumbent in the symmetric equilibrium without
entry. It follows that the incumbent will not adopt a technology worse than ALC in the
symmetric equilibrium without entry. Put dierently, if a symmetric equilibrium without
entry exists when  < LC, the incumbent will adopt a technology which is better than ALC.
QED
B Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Lemma 1 has showed that for any e and i, if   LC, the symmet-
ric equilibrium without entry exists and is unique. This part will prove that for any i,
if e   e(i), there exists C(i;e)  LC(i;e), such that when C   < LC,
the symmetric equilibrium without entry exists and is unique. C(i;e) has the form
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ed(A;Ae
j);0], where Ae




j)2   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@Ae
j = 0, and Ai
max is determined by Ai
max   A   id(A0;Ai
max) = 0.







Suppose there exists a symmetric equilibrium without entry and in this equilibrium the






























35As noted earlier, pe
j = w
Ai




































j < 0. In the symmetric equilibrium without entry
Ai



























If a symmetric equilibrium without entry exists, then in this equilibrium e
j(Ai;Ai;w)  .
Next I will use four steps to prove the existence and uniqueness. In particular, step 1
proves that the technology adopted by the incumbent in the symmetric equilibrium without
entry can not be an Ai s.t e
j(Ai;Ai;w) < . Step 2 proves that any technology Ai which
satises e
j(Ai;Ai;w) =  and Ai > ALC can be supported as a symmetric equilibrium
without entry as long as the incumbent makes nonnegative prot by adopting such Ai . Step
3 proves the uniqueness of the Ai dened in step 2. Step 4 proves that when C   < LC,
the incumbent indeed makes nonnegative prot by adopting the technology dened in the
second step.
Step 1: Suppose that there is a symmetric equilibrium without entry in which all the
incumbents adopt Ai such that e
j(Ai;Ai;w) < . Continuity then implies that there exists
a small number , such that e
j(Ai   ;Ai;w)    < 0.































Since demand is inelastic, pi
j = w





















@Ai jAi=ALC = 0 (B.6)
The inequality holds because from Lemma 1, when  < LC, the incumbent adopts a better
technology than ALC in the symmetric equilibrium without entry. The equality holds because
of (4.2). Since e
j(Ai;Ai;w)    < 0 and e
j(Ai   ;Ai;w)    < 0, (B.6) implies that the
incumbent j can make more prot by choosing Ai
j = Ai  instead of choosing Ai
j = Ai. This
contradicts with the assumption that Ai is the technology adopted by the incumbent in the
symmetric equilibrium without entry. Therefore, the incumbent will not adopt a technology
Ai such that e
j(Ai;Ai;w) <  in the symmetric equilibrium without entry.
Step 2: Let ANE denote the technology which satises e
j(ANE;ANE;w)    = 0 and
ANE > ALC. It follows that entry can be blocked if all the incumbents upgrade to ANE.
Hence, in order to prove that the symmetric equilibrium without entry exists and in such
equilibrium the incumbents upgrade to ANE, I only need to prove that when incumbents
in all the other industries upgrade to ANE, the incumbent j will also upgrade to ANE and
makes nonnegative prot. The proof follows.































37Inelastic demand implies pi
j = w







































j=ALC = 0 (B.8)






j is a decreasing function in Ai
j. The











j=ANE is a decreasing function in ANE
and ANE > ALC. The second equality holds because of (4.2).
Since e





j < 0, e
j(Ai




j;ANE;w)  < 0 if Ai
j > ANE. (B.8) then implies that the incumbent j0s prot is
decreasing in Ai
j when Ai
j  ANE, and therefore the incumbent j wants to adopt a technology
level as low as possible. But to block entry, the incumbent j must adopt a technology at
least as good as ANE, and therefore will indeed choose Ai
j = ANE. This proves that if all
the other incumbents choose ANE, the incumbent j will also choose ANE. Hence as long
as the incumbent makes nonnegative prot when adopting ANE, the symmetric equilibrium
without entry exists and in such an equilibrium, the incumbent upgrades to ANE.
Step 3: To prove the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium without entry when C 
 < LC, I only need to prove the uniqueness of ANE.
































 ALC < 0 (B.9)
38The rst inequality holds because the rst expression is decreasing in Ai, and when  < LC,
the incumbents' equilibrium technology is bigger than ALC. The second inequality holds
because e >  e. Since the left of (B.4) is decreasing in Ae
j, (B.9) implies that Ae
j < +1
 Ai.












) < 0 (B.10)
The inequality holds because Ae
j < +1
 Ai. (B.10) then implies that e
j(Ai;Ai;w) is a de-
creasing function of Ai, and therefore ANE is unique.
Step 4: From step 1 and step 2, the symmetric equilibrium without entry is determined
by e











j)    = 0 (B.11)
where Ae
j is determined by the potential entrant's rst order condition (B.4). From (B.10),
the left of (B.11) is decreasing in ANE. Applying implicit function theorem to (B.11) and
(B.4) gives @ANE
@ < 0.
In the symmetric equilibrium without entry, the incumbent's prot is B
j = ANE   A  
id(A0;ANE). It is easy to derive:
@B
j
@ANE = 1   
i@d(A0;ANE)
@ANE
When ANE = ALC, comparing the above expression with (4.2), it is easy to derive that
@B
j
@ANEjANE=ALC > 0. Because I assume that the incumbent makes nonnegative prot when
adopting ALC, it follows that the incumbent's prot is nonnegative when  = LC. As 
decreases from LC, ANE increases, and B
j increases rst, and then at some point B
j begins
to decrease. This implies that there is a Ai
max, such that when ANE  Ai
max, B
j  0.
Let 1 be the value of  which induces ANE = Ai
max. @ANE
@ < 0 implies that B
j  0 if
  1. Let C = max[1;0]. Then, if   C, B
j  0. Since the incumbent has nonnegative
prot when  = LC, it follows that C  LC when LC > 0, and C = LC = 0 when
LC = 0. LC = 0 is not a very interesting case, so in this paper, I will assume LC > 0.
The above proof only considers the case in which both the incumbent's and the potential
39entrant's choice of technology are interior. If either of them is a corner solution, it is easy
to generalize the above proof and all the results still hold. QED
C Proof of Corollary 1
Since   0, e  i, A0 > A and d is strictly decreasing in its rst argument, the incumbent
can always adopt the same technology as the potential entrant and makes more prot than
the potential entrant. This implies that entry can always be blocked, and a symmetric
equilibrium with entry can never exist.
Based on the proof of Proposition 1, to prove Corollary 1, I only need to show that
C = 0 when e  i. From step 4 of the proof of Proposition 1, this is the same as to prove
that for any   0, the incumbent can always make nonnegative prot by adopting ANE,
where ANE satises e
j(ANE;ANE;w)    = 0. The proof is as follows.
e
j(ANE;ANE;w)    = 0 implies that 8  0, when all the incumbents adopt ANE,
the potential entrant j makes 0 prot after paying the entry cost. Hence the incumbent j
will make nonnegative prot by adopting the same technology Ae
j as the potential entrant
j. From step 2 of the proof of Proposition 1, ANE is the incumbent j0s optimal choice if all
the other incumbents choose ANE. This implies that the incumbent j makes more prot by
adopting ANE than adopting Ae
j, and therefore makes nonnegative prot by adopting ANE.
This proves that for any , a symmetric equilibrium without entry exists when e  i.
Note that if e >  e, this equilibrium is also unique. QED
D Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of proposition 1 shows that the symmetric equilibrium without entry exists when
C   < LC. Proposition 2 then follows directly from Lemma 1.
E Proof of Proposition 3






@Ai = 0 (E.1)
40From the above equation, it is clear to see that the rst part of proposition 3 is true.
When C   < LC, from the proof of proposition 1, the symmetric equilibrium without








j) = 0 (E.3)




























Straightforward calculations allows one to derive and sign the partial derivatives of the F
and G functions as follows: FAi < 0 as derived in the proof of proposition 1, FAe
j = 0,
GAi = (1 + )
A1 (Ai)
(Ae




j)3   e @2d(A;Ae
j)
@(Ae
j)2 < 0, F =  1 < 0, G = 0,
Fi = 0, Gi = 0, Fe =  d(A;Ae


















































41F Proof of Proposition 4





























As noted earlier, the potential entrant j will necessarily set pe
j = w
Ai
j. It is easy to show that
the above objective function is strictly concave in Ae
j for given values of B, w and Ai
j, hence,
if the solution for Ae















In the symmetric equilibrium with entry, Ae
j = Ae and Ai
j = A0 for all j. Similar to that in
the symmetric equilibrium without entry, in the symmetric equilibrium with entry, B = Ae






@Ae = 0 (F.1)
Let AE be the entrant's technology in the symmetric equilibrium with entry. Similar to the
argument in section 4, the strict convexity of d implies that if AE is interior, it is unique and
determined by (F.1), otherwise, it is Af.19
There are two additional conditions that must be satised to guarantee the existence
of the symmetric equilibrium with entry. The rst condition is that the potential entrant's
prot is nonnegative, i.e., AE   A0   ed(A;AE)     0. The second condition is that it is
not optimal for the incumbent to block entry, i.e., B
j  0.
For a given positive i, when e = 0 and  = 0, it is easy to see that the symmetric
equilibrium with entry exists. To see this, note that since the adoption cost is zero, the
19Note that AE must be greater than A0, since otherwise, entry can be blocked.
42potential entrant operates at the technology frontier automatically and has prot Af   A0,
hence the rst condition is satised. Moreover, it is impossible for the incumbent to block
entry. Since the best the incumbent can do is to adopt the frontier technology too. However,
when both rms adopt frontier technology, they both make 0 prots at the third stage, and
therefore the incumbent has losses because it has to pay the updating cost. It follows that
the second condition is satised. This proves that the symmetric equilibrium with entry
exists for a given positive i if e = 0 and  = 0.
Now, suppose only  = 0, then, continuity implies that there is a ^ e such that the
symmetric equilibrium with entry exists for all e < ^ e. For a given e < ^ e, since the
symmetric equilibrium with entry exists when  = 0, continuity then implies that there is
a ^ , such that the symmetric equilibrium with entry exists for all  < ^ . This proves the
existence of the symmetric equilibrium with entry. The uniqueness of this equilibrium is
guaranteed by the uniqueness of AE. QED
G Proof of Proposition 5
If the symmetric equilibrium with entry exists, it is determined by (F.1). From (F.1), it is
easy to see that AE is decreasing in e and does not depend on  and i. QED
43